I maintain also that substances, whether material or immaterial, cannot be conceived in their bare essence without any activity, activity being of the essence of substance in general.

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• Gottfried Leibniz:

  Indeed every monad must be different from every other. For there are never in nature two beings, wh

• Gottfried Leibniz:

  It can have its effect only through the intervention of God, inasmuch as in the ideas of God a mona

• Gottfried Leibniz:

  It follows from what we have just said, that the natural changes of monads come from an internal pr

• Gottfried Leibniz:

  Men act like brutes in so far as the sequences of their perceptions arise through the principle of

• Gottfried Leibniz:

  Now where there are no parts, there neither extension, nor shape, nor divisibility is possible. And

• Gottfried Leibniz:

  The ultimate reason of things must lie in a necessary substance, in which the differentiation of th

• Gottfried Leibniz:

  There are also two kinds of truths: truth of reasoning and truths of fact. Truths of reasoning are

• Gottfried Leibniz:

  This is why the ultimate reason of things must lie in a necessary substance, in which the different

• Gottfried Leibniz:

  When a truth is necessary, the reason for it can be found by analysis, that is, by resolving it int

• Gottfried Leibniz:

  Whence it follows that God is absolutely perfect, since perfection is nothing but magnitude of posi